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The Developing Law of Corporate
Freeze-outs and Going Private
At common law, any fundamental corporate change, such as a
merger or the sale of corporate assets, required the unanimous con-
sent of shareholders. In effect, each shareholder held a veto power
which could restrain the majority's ability to act.' In contrast, under
present statutory corporation law, a specified percentage of share-
holder votes can effect such changes over the objections of other
shareholders,2 and the objecting shareholders may or may not be
entitled to "dissenter's" or "appraisal" rights.3 By voting in favor
of a corporate change which results in the elimination of some share-
holders, majority shareholders can force the termination of minority
shareholder interest. Such transactions are referred to as "freeze-
outs," which are defined as the exercise of corporate control by
majority or inside shareholders to eliminate minority or outside
shareholders, to reduce their relative voting power to insignificance,
or to otherwise deprive them of rights and privileges.'
Inside shareholders of several publicly-held corporations have re-
cently attempted to utilize corporate acts to eliminate public stock
ownership, a process referred to as "going-private." 5 There are two
1. In Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 595-96 (1921), the Supreme
Court stated the rule as follows:
It is, of course, a general rule of law that, in the absence of special authority so
to do, the owners of a majority of the stock of a corporation have not the power to
authorize the directors to sell all of the property of the company and thereby
abandon the enterprise for which it was organized ....
The rule .. . rests upon the principle that exercise of such power would defeat
the implied contract among the stockholders to pursue the purpose for which [the
corporation] was chartered.
2. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101 et seq. (1974). § 251 (majority vote required for
merger), § 271 (majority vote required for sale of substantially all corporate assets), § 275
(majority vote required for dissolution); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.1 et seq. (1973). § 157.64
(two-thirds vote required for merger), § 157.72 (two-thirds vote required for sale of substan-
tially all corporate assets), § 157.76 (two-thirds vote required for disolution).
3. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101 et seq. (1974). § 262 (shareholder objecting to merger
entitled to receive value of stock); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.1 et seq. (1973), § 157.70
(shareholder objecting to merger entitled to receive fair value of shares) and § 157.73 (share-
holder objecting to sale of assets entitled to receive fair value of shares).
4. 2 F. O'NAL, CLOSE CORPORATION § 8.07 at 43 (2d ed. 1971).
5. The two techniques most commonly used in going private are the tender offer addressed
to public shareholders, which is frequently followed by a merger to eliminate non-tendering
stockholders ("two-step" going private), and a merger into a corporation holding the insiders'
stock, pursuant to which the public shareholders receive cash or debt (the "one-step" going
private). Less frequently used is a reverse stock split with the public shareholders receiving
cash for their fractional shares. Borden, Going Private - Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?,
49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 987, 987-88 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Going Private - Old Tort, New
Tort or No Tort?].
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goals which may be sought by going private. The first is the elimina-
tion of all public shareholders. The other is avoiding the reporting
and filing requirements imposed upon public corporations by the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act).' Hence, any trans-
action which results in freeing a corporation from these statutory
requirements is properly labelled a going private transaction.
Since going private involves the elimination of some or all public
stockholders and the continuation of a corporation's business, it is
analogous to a corporate freeze-out. Corporate freeze-outs most
often occur in close corporations, whereas going private by defini-
tion can only occur in public corporations. Accordingly, going pri-
vate can be classified either as a subclass of freeze-outs or as the
publicly-held corporation counterpart of the close corporation
freeze-out.
Minority or public shareholders have challenged the validity of
going private freeze-outs so frequently that one commentator has
described litigation as the last step of going private.' In state courts,
these shareholders have claimed that by engineering such transac-
tions the majority shareholders have breached their fiduciary duties
to the corporation and to the minority. In federal courts, they have
claimed that such transactions are violative of federal securities
laws. In the past, freeze-out transactions have been attacked as
violative of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule 10b-51 because of
false or misleading statements, or omissions in tender offer or proxy
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1970), as amended 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78kk (Aug. 1975 Pamph).
7. Kerr, Going Private: Adopting a Corporate Purpose Standard, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 33, 34
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Going Private: Adopting a Corporate Purpose Standard].
8. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange -
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
Freeze-Outs and Going Private
materials.' Now, however, some litigants are alleging that going
private or freeze-out transactions are inherently violative of section
10(b) and rule 10b-5.' 0
The purpose of this article is to examine the scope of present laws
affecting going private and freeze-out transactions by reviewing
state and federal judicial responses to freeze-out challenges, and to
analyze the possibilities of extending federal securities laws, either
judicially or administratively, to substantively regulate freeze-outs.
Although this article primarily focuses on those freeze-outs which
effectuate going private, freeze-outs in close corporations are also
considered."
PRESENT LAW
State Law
State corporation statutes have been aptly labelled a "race for the
bottom" insofar as shareholder protection is concerned.' 2 State
courts, however, have not been reluctant to inject equity into the
statutes. Proponents of freeze-outs have relied upon the leading case
of Matteson v. Ziebarth'3 as support for the proposition that freeze-
out mergers are now permissible under statutory corporation law. In
Matteson, the Washington Supreme Court upheld a merger de-
signed to eliminate a stockholder who was blocking a proposed sale
to a purchaser who would buy only if it could acquire all the out-
standing stock. Professor Vorenberg, however, has suggested that
this case was, in fact, decided in accordance with an analogous
common law exception allowing sale of a profitless company
because there was a pressing business need for the sale.'"
9. E.g., Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 874 (1972).
10. E.g., Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
11. Few courts have made a distinction between close corporation freeze-outs and private
transactions although the underlying policy considerations differ. Going Private - Old Tort,
New Tort or No Tort?, supra note 5, at 1017-18.
12. Cary, A Proposed Federal Corporate Minimum Standards Act, 29 Bus. LAW. 1101
(1974).
13. 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952).
14. Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 1189, 1194-97 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stock-
holder's Appraisal Right]. The exception is stated as follows in Geddes v. Anaconda Copper
Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 596 (1921):
[Wihen, from any cause, the business of a corporation, not charged with duties to
the public, has proved so unprofitable that there is no reasonable prospect of con-
ducting the business in the future without loss, or when the corporation has not,
and cannot obtain, the money necessary to pay its debts and to continue the
business for which it was organized, even though it may not be insolvent in the
commercial sense, the owners of a majority of the capital stock, in their judgment
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In determining whether fiduciary duties run from majority to
minority stockholders, the minority rule, that such duties exist, is
replacing the majority rule, that they do not.' 5 Moreover, as the
cases discussed below indicate, the standards against which these
duties are being measured are becoming more stringent and the
courts are looking beneath the surfaces of transactions to evaluate
underlying motives. The cases reviewed first involve public corpora-
tions that are going or have gone private and illustrate the courts'
tendency to shift from an actual fraud analysis to one which focuses
upon a valid business purpose.
The Supreme Court of Illinois recently held in Teschner v. Chi-
cago Title & Trust Co."6 that the corporate purpose of reducing
corporate expenses and simplifying and facilitating procedures
justified a freeze-out by a 600 to one reverse stock split. In that case,
Lincoln National Corporation (Lincoln) had acquired 99.6 percent
of the outstanding stock of Chicago Title and Trust Company (Chi-
cago Title) through a Chicago Title common stock for Lincoln pre-
ferred exchange offer, and 0.28 percent through purchase. Proceed-
ing in accordance with Illinois corporation law, Lincoln effectuated
a reverse stock split that converted all minority stock to fractional
shares which Lincoln proposed to purchase for cash. Teschner, a
Chicago Title minority stockholder, claimed that eliminating her as
a stockholder was a breach of Lincoln's fiduciary duty toward her
and violated her equal protection and due process rights. The su-
preme court affirmed the trial court judgment for defendants, but
left open the question of whether a different result would follow in
other circumstances:
We do not say that under all circumstances minority shareholders
will be denied relief when the majority has proceeded under the
provisions of the [Illinois Business Corporation] Act, but we do
not consider that the plaintiff here has shown grounds for the relief
she seeks.
• . . The plaintiff's complaint made no claim of fraud or decep-
tive conduct by the defendants. It did not charge that the exchange
and discretion exercised in good faith, may authorize the sale of all of the property
of the company for an adequate consideration, and distribute among the stockhold-
ers what remains of the proceeds after the payment of its debts, even over the
objection of the owners of the minority of such stock.
15. See F. O'NEAL & J. DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES 138-39
(1961).
16. 59 Ill. 2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54 (1974), app'l. dismissed for want of substantial federal
question, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975).
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offer was unfair or that the price later offered for the shares was
inadequate. 7
It has been suggested that Illinois still adheres to the actual fraud
standard of fiduciary duty between majority and minority
stockholders." Teschner, however, implies the court's willingness to
reconsider the question if a plaintiff alleges deceptive conduct, un-
fair dealing or inadequate price. Although the court did not explic-
itly hold that a valid business purpose is a prerequisite to a valid
freeze-out, it did consider the existence of such a business purpose,
and the lack of an improper purpose, in reaching its decision. More
significantly, the facts indicate that Lincoln did, in fact, act in good
faith.'
In contrast with Teschner, in which an acquisition preceded the
going private transaction, the next two cases involve going private
transactions in which no acquisitions by outside interests were in-
volved. A New Jersey court granted a preliminary injunction halting
a going private merger in Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp."' The
controlling shareholders of Power/Mate Corporation (Power/Mate)
organized General American Industries, Inc. (General), transferred
their Power/Mate shares to General and, as directors of Power/Mate
and General, entered into a cash merger agreement. The court found
that the proposed merger was in full technical compliance with state
statutory law and did not violate any SEC rules,2 but that those
17. Id. at 457, 322 N.E.2d at 57.
18. Comment, Recent Developments in the Law of Corporate Freeze-Outs, 14 B.C. IND.
& COM. L. REv. 1252, 1272 n.128 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments in Corpo-
rate Freeze-Outs].
19. The exchange offer had been addressed to all shareholders. When Lincoln failed to
acquire all the Chicago Title shares pursuant to the exchange offer and the market for
Chicago Title stock disappeared, it apparently offered to purchase all remaining outstanding
stock. This remaining stock was held by 50 stockholders who accepted the purchase offer, by
44 "lost" stockholders and small estates, and by plaintiff, the only dissenting stockholder.
The fact that so many stockholders accepted the exchange or purchase offer provides strong
support for the conclusion that Lincoln had acted fairly toward the minority shareholders in
its acquisition of Chicago Title. 59 Ill. 2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54.
20. 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (1975).
21. The court was referring only to the proxy rules of section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970), the requirements of which had been met by Power/Mate's board
sending Power/Mate shareholders notice of a special meeting, together with a proxy state-
ment which included the following information: the Power/Mate and General officers and
directors were identical; the 71.5 percent of Power/Mate owned by General would be voted
in favor of the merger and therefore the merger would be approved; under state law sharehold-
ers would have no legal right to dissent; the Power/Mate board believed the terms of the
proposed merger were fair and equitable although the merger price was advantageous to the
former majority stockholders; the merger price was based upon the report of an independent
financial consultant; the objective of the merger was to eliminate the publicly-held interest
in Power/Mate; and the Power/Mate board believed the public shareholders would benefit
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conclusions did not preclude it from considering whether the merger
would satisfy equitable requirements of good faith and fair treat-
ment:
At a minimum [the controlling shareholders'] conduct is subject
to a searching inquiry to determine whether it conforms to ac-
cepted concepts of fairness and equity.22
In People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc.,23 the majority shareholders of
Concord Fabrics, Inc. had planned a two-step going private proce-
dure, but abandoned the tender offer when public shareholders filed
suit and proceeded to the proposed merger. Acting pursuant to New
York's Blue Sky Law,24 the New York attorney general brought suit
to enjoin the merger. In granting a preliminary injunction the court
refused to follow Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc.,25 an earlier
freeze-out case in which the court had held that dissenting share-
holders would be limited to their appraisal rights where only bad
faith was shown. The court noted that since Blumenthal had been
decided, the concept of the majority shareholder fiduciary duty to
the minority had been expanded by New York courts. The court
noted:
[Tihere appears to have been a balancing of the equities between
whether dissenting shareholders must be relegated to actions at
law or obtain relief in equity, depending on the peculiar circum-
stances and exigencies of a given situation.2"
The courts in Berkowitz and Concord Fabric enjoined going pri-
vate mergers because they questioned the "fairness" of the mergers.
However, the courts were speaking of different types of "fairness."
from the merger because the merger price was greater than the market bid price and because
the stock had no liquidity. Id.
22. Id. at 45, 342 A.2d at 574. The court indicated that one focus of that searching
inquiry would be the $100,000 year-end bonus each of the two controlling stockholders had
received from Power/Mate three months before the merger was proposed. Since those bonuses
significantly reduced Power/Mate earnings, they might have affected the market price for
Power/Mate stock which had been tied into the merger terms. The court accorded little
weight to the appraiser's report because his conclusion regarding the fairness of the merger
price was based largely upon a comparison with terms of other freeze-out or going private
transactions, and not on prices determined in arms-length transactions.
23. 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,220 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, June 12, 1975). The transac-
tion at issue in Concord Fabrics was also challenged in a federal district court, Marshel v.
AFW Fabric Corp., 398 F.Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), in which the federal court refused to
enjoin the merger. See text accompanying notes 72 and 74 infra.
24. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 353 et seq. (McKinney 1968).
25. 202 Misc. 988, 989 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1952), discussed at length in
Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Shareholder's Appraisal Right, supra note 14, at 1197-1200.
26. People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,220 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y.
County, June 12, 1975).
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In Berkowitz the court was referring to the fairness of the merger
price, whereas in Concord Fabric the court was referring to the
fairness of forcing the minority shareholders out of the corporation.
The courts also differed in their evaluations of the necessity for a
valid corporate purpose. The court in Concord Fabric considered the
lack of a corporate purpose as an additional factor warranting an
injunction. The court in Berkowitz, however, found it unnecessary
to rule that the absence of a corporate purpose would invalidate a
merger, and enjoined the merger solely on the issue of fairness.
The foregoing cases reflect state court concern for the minority
shareholder in a public corporation. The following cases show that
this concern becomes more pronounced when the minority share-
holder before the court holds stock in a close corporation.
The decision of the Supreme Court of California in Jones v. H.F.
Ahmanson & Co. 7 has been hailed as a leading case upholding
minority shareholder rights."8 In Ahmanson, a minority shareholder
of a closely-held savings and loan association complained of the
actions of former majority shareholders who had transferred their
savings and loan stock (which constituted 85 percent of the out-
standing stock) to a new corporation and had created a market for
the new corporation's shares, thereby profiting from the trading in
the new corporation stock and foreclosing the possibility of a public
market for the savings and loan stock. The parent corporation at-
tempted to eliminate the minority interest in the savings and loan
association by a tender offer, by a refusal to declare dividends and,
finally, by an exchange offer.
The court summarily rejected defendants' argument that they
owed no fiduciary obligation to the minority absent reliance on in-
side information, appropriation of corporate assets or fraud. The
court stated:
[Miajority shareholders, either singly or acting in concert to ac-
complish a joint purpose, have a fiduciary responsibility to the
minority . . . to use their ability to control the corporation in a
fair, just, and equitable manner. Majority shareholders may not
use their power to control corporate activities to benefit themselves
alone or in a manner detrimental to the minority.29
27. 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
28. Recent Developments in Corporate Freeze-Outs, supra note 18, at 1257.
29. Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 108, 460 P.2d 464, 471, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592, 599 (1969); accord, Thompson v. Hambrick, 508 S.W.2d 949, 952-54 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974), whether majority stockholders of close corporation, who had refused offer to purchase
all corporate stock at $45 per share and who later secretly agreed to sell their stock at $55
per share to same offerors breached fiduciary duty to minority stockholders, raised factual
issue precluding summary judgment. See also Grognet v. Fox Valley Trucking Service, 45
19761
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[Tihe comprehensive rule of good faith and inherent fairness to
the minority in any transaction where control of the corporation is
material properly governs controlling shareholders in this state. "
The court concluded that proof that defendants had used their ma-
jority power to create a market benefiting only themselves, to the
detriment of the minority, would establish a prima facie case of
breach of fiduciary duty, rebuttable at trial only by evidence of good
faith or compelling business purpose. Accordingly, the court re-
manded the case for trial.
Last year the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted
an even stricter standard for shareholders in close corporations by
imposing an equal opportunity rule in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co. of New England, Inc.3' When minority shareholders of a close
corporation learned that the corporation had redeemed shares of the
former majority shareholder, they offered their shares to the corpo-
ration on the same terms. When the corporation refused, the minor-
ity shareholders sued, alleging that this conduct constituted a
breach of fiduciary duty. The trial judge, applying a standard of
good faith and inherent fairness, dismissed the case on the merits.
On appeal the court reaffirmed this standard as the rule for share-
holders of public corporations, but adopted a more stringent test for
close corporations. It stated:
Because of the fundamental resemblance of the close corporation
to the partnership, the trust and confidence which are essential to
this scale and manner of enterprise, and the inherent danger to
minority interests in the close corporation, we hold that stockhold-
ers in the close corporation owe one another substantially the same
fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe
to one another . . . . "utmost good faith and loyalty. ' '3
These cases demonstrate that state courts are aware that majority
shareholders can abuse their control power in transactions which
adversely affect a relatively helpless minority. In order to protect
minority shareholders, the courts have not permitted majority
shareholders to abusively exercise their power. The courts are in-
creasing the restrictions limiting the use of majority shareholder's
controlling power and requiring that the majority deal fairly with
minority shareholders. A rule of good faith and inherent fairness is
Wis. 2d 235, 241, 172 N.W.2d 812, 816 (1969), majority stockholder of corporation cannot take
position that his self-interest is superior to that of minority stockholder.
30. 1 Cal. 3d 93, 112, 460 P.2d 464, 474, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 602 (1969).
31. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
32. Id. at 515.
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supplanting the former rule that actual fraud was necessary before
a court would hold that majority shareholders had abused their
powers.
Majority shareholders are deemed to owe a fiduciary duty to mi-
nority shareholders in transactions which affect corporate control.
The standard against which conduct of majority shareholders is
measured varies among states. The standards applied are best visu-
alized as points along a continuum. At one end is an actual fraud
standard: controlling shareholders will be deemed to have abused
their power only if they actually intend to fraudulently injure mi-
nority shareholders. At the other end is the Massachusetts equal
opportunity standard: majority shareholders will be held to have
abused their control power whenever they withhold from the minor-
ity any potential benefit they may enjoy. At some point on the
continuum lies the standard of good faith and inherent fairness.
When applying the relevant standard to a particular transaction,
the courts weigh many factors, including the size of the corporation,
the type of transaction at issue, the terms of the transaction and the
purpose for the transaction. The courts tend to scrutinize freeze-
outs more carefully in close corporation cases and apply a more
stringent standard of fairness. This differentiation is sound because
there are more opportunities for abuse in close corporations and
because such abuse may have a greater impact upon shareholders
in close corporations. Current cases indicate that the courts tend to
permit freeze-outs for valid business purposes if the terms of the
transaction are fair.n
Although there is disagreement as to whether state courts are
adequately enforcing rights of minority shareholders, 34 those who
would extend rule 10b-5 to create and enforce a federal fiduciary
duty must frame their question in terms of providing an additional,
complementary remedy. Arthur Fleischer, Jr., a former Executive
Assistant to the SEC Chairman, has declared himself against such
unlimited expansion of rule 10b-5 because:
[lit would involve the federal courts in working out federal rules
to govern every aspect of corporate behavior that involves securi-
ties. This would be unfortunate. It is clear that federal law should
not cover every breach of duty associated with a securities
transaction. Thus, a repurchase by a company of its own stock at
33. E.g., Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59 Ill. 2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54 (1974), app'l.
dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975).
34. Compare, Going Private: Adopting a Corporate Purpose Standard, supra note 7, at
57-59, with Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 920 (1975).
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fair market value, but for an improper purpose, should be ex-
cluded. 5
Federal Law
In November, 1974, SEC Commissioner A.A. Sommer, Jr. con-
demned going private as "serious, unfair, and sometimes disgrace-
ful, a perversion of the whole process of public financing."36
In the opinion of Commissioner Sommer, stock liquidity is of
primary importance to the public investor. Such liquidity depends
in part on there being enough stock in public hands to assure a
reasonably active market. When public shareholders are faced with
an issuer tender offer, Commissioner Sommer contends, they have
little real choice; either they tender their shares and lose future
growth, or they retain their shares (assuming the tender offer is not
followed by a cash merger) and lose the liquidity of their investment
and federal protection. If the going private transaction takes the
form of a cash merger, either as a follow-up to a tender offer or as a
one-step going private transaction, or a reverse stock split, the pub-
lic shareholders have no choice. Commissioner Sommer recognized
that some corporate freeze-outs are justified.37 He argues that the
presence or absence of a compelling corporate business purpose
should be determinative and that proof of such a purpose should be
a condition precedent to going private. While he gave no hint as to
what purposes he would consider sufficiently compelling, he clearly
specified some which are not: repurchasing the corporation's stock
as an investment because the market price is less than book value;
avoiding the costs incident to listing on a national securities ex-
change or registration with the SEC; avoiding the costs of maintain-
ing required records and sending required disclosures; and avoiding
the threat of litigation concomitant to federal securities laws. 8
What Commissioner Sommer finds inherently unethical about
going private is that the going private price, even if it is above the
current market price, is significantly less than the initial public
offering price, and that the value of the inside shareholders' stock
is exponentially increased without any additional investment by
them. Moreover, in his view going private is not only unethical, but
also unlawful under concepts of commom law fiduciary duty and
35. Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1146, 1166
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Federal Corporation Law].
36. Sommer, Going Private: A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, [1974-75 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,010 at 84,695 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Sommer I.
37. Sommer, Further Thoughts on "Going Private," BNA SEC. REG. L. REP. 294, D-1
(March 19, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Sommer II].
38. Sommer I, supra note 36, at 84,695-96.
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federal securities laws. 9 He accordingly encourages federal courts to
find going private transactions violative of rule 10b-5 by broadly
interpreting the rule.4"
The federal courts, however, have not been consistent in their
approaches to cases involving corporate freeze-outs or other conflict
of interest transactions. Prior to the recognition of implied private
causes of action under the federal securities laws, the courts
acquired jurisdiction over cases involving intracorporate fiduciary
duties on the basis of diversity or under federal laws other than
securities laws.4' After federal courts had implied a private cause of
action under rule 10b-542 and relaxed the purchaser-seller standing
rule43 of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.," plaintiffs began alleg-
ing that directors and majority stockholders had violated section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 in conflict of interest transactions.4" Most of
these cases involved issuance of corporate shares to insiders for in-
adequate consideration or mergers with control persons on terms
unfair to minority stockholders. In each case, false representations
or nondisclosure to some or all directors or to other stockholders was
also alleged. Where, however, full and fair disclosure had been made
to all stockholders regarding conflict of interest transactions, federal
courts have reached opposite conclusions. The Second Circuit
deemed a claim under rule 10b-5 for injunctive relief precluded by
full disclosure since such disclosure satisfied the requirements of the
39. Commissioner Sommer's view that going private violates present federal securities
laws echoes a 1971 SEC ruling, House of Adler, Inc., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 78,515 (1971). Adler planned a stock repurchase plan to reduce the number of
its shareholders to less than 300, through a tender offer directed to those shareholders who
owned less than 150 shares. The Commission staff reply indicated the proposed tender offer
might violate the anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act since a successful tender offer would
result in deregistration under section 12(g) of the 1934 Act and would deprive remaining
shareholders of the protection afforded shareholders of registered issuers.
40. Sommer I, supra note 36, at 84,698; Sommer II, supra note 37, at D-3.
41. E.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), holding that bankruptcy court properly
disallowed claim of a controlling stockholder of bankrupt corporation who had reduced his
alleged salary claim to judgment against corporation because underlying claim did not repre-
sent an "honest debt" of the bankrupt corporation; Lebold v. Inland S.S. Co., 82 F.2d 351
(7th Cir. 1936), denial of injunction prohibiting dissolution of West Virginia corporation by
parent corporation affirmed because plaintiff failed to establish proof of actual fraud; suit
dismissed without prejudice since future actions of parent might justify equitable relief.
42. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
43. See Bromberg, Are There Limits to Rule lOb-5?, 29 Bus. LAW. 167, 173 (1974).
44. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
45. E.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 906 (1969); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d
872 (5th Cir. 1970); Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 970 (196').
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rule." In contrast, the District Court of Colorado indicated that
although full disclosure had been made, an intrinsically unfair
transaction would violate rule 10b-5. 47
There are two lines of federal cases involving freeze-outs under
rule 10b-5. The first interprets the function of section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 as insuring complete disclosure; hence, an alleged lack of
corporate purpose or low valuation is irrelevant to a section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 claim. In the second line of cases the courts treat
nondisclosure as only one facet of a section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
violation and require a showing of fairness or a valid corporate busi-
ness purpose as a prerequisite to a freeze-out.
The first case requiring a valid business purpose for a freeze-out
merger was Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co." Bryan was a minority
shareholder in Brock & Blevins Co., Inc. (Brock & Blevins) who
resigned as an officer and director on October 17, 1970 as a result of
a company management problem. Beginning October 14, 1970, the
other stockholders attempted to purchase Bryan's stock through a
series of overtures which culminated in a November 18, 1971 meet-
ing. At this meeting, an ultimatum was given to Bryan: if he refused
to sell his shares, "fundamental corporate changes [in the form of
a merger with a new corporation] would be necessary in order to
acquire [his] stock." 4 When Bryan refused to sell, the other stock-
holders formed a new corporate shell, Power Erectors, Inc. (Power
Erectors), and exchanged their Brock & Blevins stock for Power
Erector stock. The Power Erector Board of Directors recommended
to its shareholders that Brock & Blevins be merged into Power Erec-
tors under a plan of merger resulting in the cancellation of the Brock
& Blevins stock owned by Power Erectors and in a cash payment to
Bryan. Bryan, who had been notified of a special meeting of Brock
& Blevins shareholders, brought suit to have the proposed merger
enjoined, alleging that the proposed merger was a scheme to defraud
him of his status as a shareholder in an existing corporation, and
was therefore violative of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
The defendants asserted that the proposed merger was permissi-
ble under Georgia corporation law,50 and that the long-standing
46. Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
47. deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 300 F. Supp. 834 (D. Colo. 1969), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, without consideration of the constructive fraud issue, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir.
1970).
48. 343 F.Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974).
The court found additional section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 violations in defendants' failure to
disclose the probable expansion of the corporation by the acquisition of another business and
by going public.
49. Id. at 1065.
50. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1001(b)(3) (1970 Rev.) permits a merger plan whereby some
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company policy of Brock & Blevins to have only active employees
as shareholders was a valid business purpose supporting the pro-
posed merger. The district court found that no such company policy
existed." The court characterized the assertion of the company pol-
icy as a scheme and contrivance in violation of the majority
shareholders' and directors' fiduciary duty to Bryan as a minority
shareholder.
Accordingly, the court enjoined the proposed merger because of
the following violations of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5: defendants
had deliberately withheld material information; Power Erectors had
been formed with the arbitrary restriction that only active share-
holders of Brock & Blevins could obtain Power Erectors stock; and
the proposed merger itself would have operated as a fraud upon
Bryan since it was planned for the sole purpose of eliminating Bryan
and not for any valid business purpose. 2
shareholders receive cash instead of shares of the surviving corporation. § 22-1202 provides
that a shareholder who dissents from a merger plan is entitled to receive the fair value of his
shares and is not entitled to any other rights he might have had as a shareholder "except
where the corporation by fraud has induced the shareholder to enforce his dissenter's rights."
51. The court based its finding on the following facts: Judge Painter, an Assistant Secre-
tary and Director of Brock & Blevins, who had never been an active employee, attempted to
purchase Bryan's stock; neither Bryan nor Power Erectors, the then-majority shareholder of
Brock & Blevins, had been active employees of Brock & Blevins; Bryan was unaware of such
a policy; and there was considerable evidence that Brock & Blevins might go public in the
near future. The court failed to reconcile its finding that Judge Painter individually had
attempted to purchase Bryan's stock with its earlier finding that Judge Painter had repre-
sented himself as acting for the other stockholders. Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F.
Supp. 1062, 1064 (N.D. Ga. 1972). Moreover, the finding that Bryan had never been an
employee of Brock & Blevins conflicts with the court's earlier finding that Bryan had been
employed by Brock & Blevins for 15 years. Id. at 1064.
52. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit focused only upon the pendent jurisdiction issue of
whether Georgia corporation law permitted the proposed merger. The district court opinion
does not indicate that plaintiff joined a state law claim to his federal claim. However, since
the Fifth Circuit found that the federal claim presented a serious and material question, it
took the position that the district court had pendent jurisdiction over "[any equitable cause
of action that would lie under the same proof and the same findings" and approved the
district court decision "on the basis of general equity and state law grounds." 490 F.2d at
571 (emphasis added). The court accepted the trial court finding that the sole purpose of the
proposed merger was the elimination of Bryan as a minority stockholder and interpreted this
finding as an implicit construction of Georgia corporation law. Although no Georgia court had
so construed the statute, the court read a limitation into the statute, finding that it had been
intended only to allow the merger of two viable pre-exisiting corporations, but that a merger
into a newly-formed corporation would be fraudulent and therefore excepted from operation
of the statute. In so holding, the court stated that by utilizing the merger statute to eliminate
a troublesome minority, defendants would be doing indirectly something they could not do
directly. Relying upon the equitable principle that the majority shareholder has a fiduciary
duty to the minority which prohibits the majority from using its powers for its personal
advantage, the court held that the proposed merger was a violation of the Brock & Blevins
majority shareholders' duties under general principles of equity and state corporation law.
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In Albright v. Bergendahl,53 the District Court of Utah applied a
corporate purpose test and the reasoning of the district court in
Bryan to a going private suit. In Albright, the majority shareholders
of International Service Industries, Inc. (International) had caused
the formation of Body Contours, Inc. (Body Contours) and the
merger of International into Body Contours pursuant to a plan
whereby the International inside majority received the capital stock
of Body Contours and the International public minority received
cash. The court held that the merger was a device, scheme or artifice
to defraud, or an act, practice or course of business which operated
as a fraud or deceit upon the International public minority in viola-
tion of rule 10b-5, and that the conduct of the International majority
constituted a breach of their fiduciary duties to the minority.54 In
so holding, the court determined that defendants' purpose for the
merger, "the belief of the [International] Board of Directors that
[the corporation was] not a viable vehicle for the publicly held
stock,"'5 ' was not a legitimate corporate purpose. Accordingly, the
merger was voided.
The corporate purpose test was applied by the District Court for
the Northern District of Florida to validate the proposed merger
challenged in Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc."6 In that
case, the management of Meridian Investing and Development Cor-
poration (Meridian) had sought an investor which would make a
substantial investment in Meridian by purchasing its stock. The
management found such an investor in Donaldson, Lufkin & Jen-
rette, Inc. (DLJ) which acquired an aggregate of 57 percent of the
outstanding Meridian stock through two separate public tender of-
fers.57 The court found that DLJ's acquisition of Meridian stock was
originally intended as an investment. When the market price for
Meridian failed to rise, DLJ's management deemed it desirable to
make the corporation's investment in Meridian more permanent
and proposed a merger between Meridian and a new second-tier
53. 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1975).
54. The opinion fails to state whether the breach of fiduciary duty was premised upon
federal or state law.
55. Supplemental Proxy Statement, quoted by the court in Albright v. Bergendahl, 391
F. Supp. 754, 756 (D. Utah 1975).
56. 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla. 1974).
57. At the time of the first tender offer, the management of DLJ did not wish to have the
Meridian financial statements consolidated into DLJ financials which would have been nec-
essary if DLJ acquired more than 50 percent of the outstanding Meridian stock. Accordingly,
the first tender offer was limited to less than 50 percent of the outstanding Meridian stock.
Several months later, the opposition to Meridian and DLJ consolidated financials had de-
creased and DLJ made a second tender offer through which it acquired the remainder of its
57 percent of the outstanding Meridian stock. 392 F. Supp at 1397-99.
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subsidiary of DLJ. Under the proposed merger plan, the minority
Meridian shareholders would receive cash for their Meridian stock.
A minority shareholder of Meridian filed suit to enjoin the proposed
merger on the basis of the decision in Bryan.
The court distinguished Bryan from the present case because the
merger proposed in Bryan was a "paper transaction without any real
effect on the business involved other than to get rid of the sole
minority shareholder." 8 In contrast, the managements of DLJ and
Meridian had valid business reasons for the proposed merger. Since
both corporations were engaged in similar businesses, merging their
operations was not only logical, but there was justified concern over
potential claims of conflict of interest as long as some Meridian
stock was held by a public minority." Additionally, the merger
would reduce annual operating expenses and could be effected by
merging Meridian directly into an existing subsidiary of DLJ, with
the same ultimate effect upon the Meridian public shareholders.
Therefore, the proposed merger was more than a paper transaction
and passed the legitimate business purpose test followed in Bryan.
In response to plaintiff's contention that a minority could never be
eliminated through merger, the court found that:
[T]he [state] legislature has determined that a stockholder has
no absolute right to his interest in the corporation and may be
forced to surrender his shares for a fair cash price.10
While recognizing that the Meridian minority stockholders could
not be subjected to inequitable conduct by the majority stockholder,
the court found no evidence of fraud or over-reaching on the part of
DLJ and, further, determined that the price offered to the minority
shareholders was fair and equitable.
Other courts have held that going private does not raise a federal
question under the 1934 Act if full disclosure has been made. The
most publicized going private transaction, and one condemned by
SEC Commissioner Sommer,6 involved the exchange offer of Wells,
Rich, Greene, Inc. (WRG). As a result of two public offerings, the
public had invested more than $14 million in WRG, most of which
went directly to its officers, directors and employees.2 In November,
1974, WRG extended an offer to purchase all the publicly-held
58. Id. at 1402.
59. See Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, supra note 14, at
1198.
60. 392 F. Supp. 1393, 1403. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251 et seq. (1974).
61. Sommer I, supra note 36, at 84,697.
62. See Affidavit of Stanley Nemser, reprinted in PLI, THE SEC SPEAKS IN 1975, at 528-
29 (1975).
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shares in exchange for cash and ten-year debentures. A public
shareholder sought to have the exchange offer enjoined and with-
drawn and to have all tendered shares returned, alleging inter alia
that the exchange was an attempt to squeeze out the public at an
unfair price."3
In denying plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, the
court recognized that the going private issue is "undeniably serious
and troublesome," but that:
[T]here is nothing invalid per. se in a corporate effort to free itself
from federal regulations, provided the means and the methods
used to effectuate that objective are allowable under the law. Nor
has the federal securities law placed profit-making or shrewd busi-
ness tactics designed to benefit insiders, without more, beyond the
pale. Those laws in respect of their design and interpretative reach,
as I understand them, including [section 10(b) and 14(e)] relied
on here, are satisfied if a full and fair disclosure is made, so that
the decision of the holders of WRG stock to accept or refuse the
exchange offer can be said to have been freely based upon adequate
information."
The court stated that even if this interpretation of the scope of
the 1934 Act was incorrect, plaintiff's remedy at law would be ade-
quate. 5
The court in Kaufmann, relied upon the Second Circuit's decision
in Popkin v. Bishop6 in holding that the requirements of section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 are met in freeze-out cases when full disclosure
to shareholders has been made. Popkin arose out of the proposed
merger of Bell Intercontinental Corporation (Bell) and two of its
subsidiaries into The Equity Corporation (Equity), the major stock-
holder of Bell. A Bell shareholder alleged a violation of rule 10b-5
in that the proposed exchange ratios were unfair to the merging
corporations and their minority shareholders and the officers and
directors of Bell had breached their fiduciary duties by proposing
those ratios. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dis-
missal of the complaint. In so doing, the court began with the as-
sumption that plaintiff was correct in contending the exchange
ratios were unfair. The court found the complaint deficient in that
63. Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd per curiam, No. 74-
2591 (2d Cir. Apr. 3, 1975).
64. Id. at 17.
65. The court also noted that plaintiff apparently stood alone in his opposition to the
proposed exchange and that if sizeable opposition to the exchange proposal did in fact exist,
WRG's plan to go private would fail. Significant opposition to the exchange proposal did
exist. After the exchange offer, 43 percent of WRG's outstanding stock remained in public
hands. Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1975, at 18, col. 3.
66. 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972).
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it contained no allegation of any misrepresentation or nondisclosure
of a material fact by defendants. The court disagreed with plaintiff's
argument that,
"Rule 10b-5 is more than a disclosure provision" and that the Rule
affords minority shareholders protection against overreaching by
majority shareholders and directors "[wihether the facts remain
hidden from the minority or are ultimately revealed . .. ...
Judge Feinberg distinguished Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,"8 in which
the Second Circuit had introduced the rule 10b-5 concept now
known as "new fraud.""9 In Schoenbaum, the court held that the
controlling shareholder and the board of directors had violated rule
10b-5 by issuing stock to the controlling shareholder at an inade-
quate price and by withholding material information from the mi-
nority shareholders. Although Judge Hays' opinion in Schoenbaum
had "suggested that the alleged improper self-dealing itself consti-
tuted a violation,"7 in Popkin Judge Feinberg found that the non-
disclosure by the controlling stockholder and the board of directors
had been an essential element of the rule 10b-5 violation. He stated:
[O]ur emphasis on improper self-dealing did not eliminate non-
disclosure as a key issue in Rule 10b-5 cases. Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 are designed principally to impose
a duty to disclose and inform rather than to become enmeshed in
passing judgments on information elicited. [citations omitted]
This design has special relevance to merger transactions that,
under state law, must be subjected to shareholder approval. In the
context of such transactions, if federal law ensures that share-
holder approval is fairly sought and freely given, the principal
federal interest is at an end. Underlying questions of the wisdom
of such transactions or even their fairness become tangential at
best to federal regulation.7'
It is this rationale which has been consistently applied by judges
in the Southern District of New York in refusing to enjoin a pro-
67. Id. at 718.
68. 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
69. In Schoenbaum, the court reversed the summary judgment for defendants in a deriva-
tive suit wherein the plaintiff alleged that the corporation's controlling shareholder, Aquitane
Company of Canada, Ltd. (Aquitane), had exercised its controlling influence over the corpo-
ration's board of directors in order to cause the corporation to issue to it a substantial amount
of treasury stock at a price which Aquitane knew to be grossly inadequate. The court held
that the complaint stated a triable claim under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 because if the
plaintiff's allegations were true, (a) Aquitane had engaged in an act, practice or course of
business which had operated as a fraud or deceit within the meaning of rule 10b-5(3), and
(b) Aquitane and the directors had deceived the other shareholders of the corporation.
70. Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1972).
71. Id.
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posed merger or tender offer, particularly since they deem money
damages an adequate remedy if plaintiffs prove their claims." When
frozen shareholders have sought money damages, however, their
complaints have been dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. In those cases in which plaintiffs
have alleged mergers to be fraudulent for lack of a corporate busi-
ness purpose, the courts have stated that the presence or absence
of a business purpose was irrelevant to the alleged violations of
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.11
In two going private cases, Dreier v. The Music Makers Group,
Inc. " and Greenberg v. Institutional Investor Systems, Inc.," minor-
ity shareholders presented novel arguments. In Dreier, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendants had failed to make full and accurate
disclosure in a 1967 prospectus and registration statement in which
72. Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. v. Haynie, 388 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Mar-
shel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 398 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Dreier v. The Music Makers
Group, Inc., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,406 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd per curiam, No. 74-2591 (2d
Cir. Apr. 3, 1975).
73. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Greenberg v.
Institutional Investor Sys., Inc., [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,231 (S.D.N.Y. July
1, 1975).
74. Tanzer Economic Associates, Inc. v. Haynie, 388 F. Supp. 365, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1974):
"The absence of a [corporate] purpose is, for federal purposes at least, a matter of no
consequence." Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 398 F. Supp. 734, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975):
Plaintiffs rely on decisions in other circuits holding mergers which eliminate
public shareholders without a corporate business purpose violative of Rule 10b-5.
[footnote omitted] The cases in this circuit and in this district, however, are to
the contrary.
Greenberg v. Institutional Investor Sys., Inc., [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,231 at
98,221 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1975): "[Tlhe alleged lack of proper business purpose in the Com-
pany's efforts to go private, simply [does] not state a federal claim." Green v. Santa Fe
Indus., Inc., 391 F.Supp. 849, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1975): "The Court does not view Rule 10b-5 as
requiring a federal district court to analyze the motives of corporate directors, at least not in
the absence of actual fraud and deceit."
In addition, in Green the court concluded that SEC Proposed Rule 13e-3B which would
make any going private transaction initiated by an issuer unlawful unless there was a valid
business purpose for the transaction, evidenced the SEC's:
own estimate of the reach and the limitations of existing regulations in dealing with
"going private" transactions ....
Implicit in the Commission's expressed intent to enact these or similar rules is
the conclusion . . . that existing rules, including Rule 10b-5, do not reach the sort
of acts complained of.
Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In the same case, the
court refused to read a valid business purpose requirement into the Delaware short-form
merger statute based on rule 10b-5, in contrast with the Bryan court's interpretation of the
Georgia merger statute.
75. [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,053 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), [1973-74
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,406 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
76. [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,231 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1975).
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The Music Makers Group, Inc. (Music Makers) shares had been
offered. The alleged nondisclosure was defendants' intention to go
private six years later by merging Music Makers into a then non-
existent corporation. Plaintiff attempted to telescope the registra-
tion and subsequent merger into a scheme to defraud. Because of
the novelty of plaintiff's claim regarding the 1967 prospectus and
registration statement, and the problems of proving the claim, the
court refused to dismiss the claim. Instead, the court directed plain-
tiff to file a more detailed amended complaint.
Dreier's argument was modeled on the successful argument in
United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Products, Inc." The corporate
defendant in United Funds proposed to issue a new class of non-
voting common stock. Issuance of such stock would have resulted
in delisting by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Plaintiffs
sought an injunction prohibiting the issuance of the new class of
stock, alleging that they had relied on a statement in the offering
prospectus that application would be made for listing the common
stock of the corporation on the NYSE; that the common stock had
been and continued to be so listed; that they would be injured if the
common stock were delisted; and that the only purpose for the
proposed issuance of non-voting common stock was to preserve the
controlling stockholder's control of the corporation while he utilized
the non-voting common stock in his estate planning. The court
granted the injunction because the prospectus statement was an
implied promise to obtain and continue NYSE listing. Pursuant to
section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts,7" the defendant corpora-
tion was obligated to continue the listing, absent a proper corporate
purpose, and no such corporate purpose had been shown.7"
A similar argument was raised but rejected in Greenberg. Plain-
tiff argued that since the corporation's stock had been registered
with the SEC when defendants initiated an allegedly fraudulent
going private freeze-out which resulted in deregistration, she should
not be deprived of the protection shareholders receive under the
SEC proxy rules. The court foreclosed plaintiff's claim of detrimen-
tal reliance. Since the stock had not been registered when she pur-
chased it, she could not claim that her purchase "was induced in
77. [1961-64 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,288 (Bait. City Cir. Ct. 1963).
78. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932) provides:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise.
79. In addition, the court held that the controlling shareholder's attempt to have the new
class of stock issued was a breach of his fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders.
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part by the expectation that she would enjoy the protections that
accompany registration. ' "
On the whole, district court judges have not encouraged minority
shareholders to bring their going private complaints to federal
courts. In most cases, the courts have refused to consider whether
or not a particular transaction is fair or whether a valid corporate
purpose for the transaction exists. These courts have relied upon the
premise that the function of rule 10b-5 is to force insiders and is-
suers to accurately disclose all details of a going private transaction.
If full disclosure has been made, these courts have ruled that no
securities law question was presented. If such disclosure has not
been made, the courts have temporarily enjoined the transaction
until an omission or misstatement is corrected, and the correction
has reached minority shareholders. Once this has been done, how-
ever, the courts have found that the requirements of rule 10b-5 are
satisfied and that the transaction can proceed.
Three district court judges have interpreted rule 10b-5 differently.
In Bryan, the district court considered whether a valid corporate
purpose for the freeze-out merger at issue existed and found no such
purpose. The court then concluded that the freeze-out merger itself
operated as a fraud under rule 10b-5. This conclusion can be inter-
preted in two ways. First, it can be viewed as dictum. Since the
court found the traditional type of rule 10b-5 nondisclosure viola-
tion, that violation alone was sufficient to support its judgment for
the plaintiff. Secondly, it can be and has been considered the es-
sence of the Bryan decision. In holding that a going private trans-
action was a fraud under rule 10b-5, the Albright court merely
stated that it found the reasoning of the court in Bryan persua-
sive.8' In measuring the freeze-out merger at issue in Grimes against
a valid business purpose standard, the court there simply distin-
guished Bryan on the facts and found it inapplicable.82 In fact,
Bryan has been interpreted as creating a federal fiduciary law under
rule 10b-5.13
If this second interpretation is correct, the court's opinion is defi-
cient in that it contains no analysis whatsoever supporting the crea-
tion of a federal fiduciary duty. In support of its conclusion that the
freeze-out merger was a fraud under rule 10b-5, the court stated the
familiar rule that federal securities laws should be interpreted liber-
80. Greenberg v. Institutional Investors Sys., Inc., [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
95,231 at 98,221 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1975).
81. Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754, 756 (D. Utah 1975).
82. Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393, 1401 (N.D. Fla.
1974).
83. See Recent Developments in Corporate Freeze-Outs, supra note 18, at 1270.
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ally to effectuate their remedial purposes. However, the court failed
to explain why this liberal construction makes a freeze-out an arti-
fice to defraud. Its conclusion that a freeze-out is violative of rule
10b-5 was wholly unsupported. Supportive reasoning may not be
necessary where a court is following clear precedent. Where, how-
ever, a court is making new law, a well-reasoned opinion is expected,
particularly where the law created is federal common law impinging
upon existing state law.
Since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,84 there has been no general federal
common law. Federal courts have, however, found that federal com-
mon law does exist in a few areas. Such federal common law has not
been created casually in those areas in which state law has tradi-
tionally governed because of the presumption in favor of applying
state law. 85 This presumption is overcome if a federal statute clearly
evidences a congressional interest in having a particular issue re-
solved by federal law.8" Evidence of such interest must be found by
analyzing the intended scope of a statute and considering whether
it was intended to pre-empt state law, or by determining that the
need for uniformity mandates creation of such federal law. 7
State law has traditionally governed intracorporate matters.
Therefore, the presumption in favor of state law must be overridden
before a federal fiduciary law can be created under rule 10b-5. The
1934 Act was not intended to pre-empt state law in matters of all
internal corporate affairs dealing with securities. 8  Accordingly, the
creation of a federal fiduciary law can only be justified by a compel-
ling need for a uniform law of fiduciary duty. Such a need may be
necessary in formulating remedies for the breach of duties imposed
by federal law, or when the inconvenience to the federal government
arising from fifty diverse rules outweighs the inconvenience to
individuals of being governed by two different sources of law."8 The
need for a uniform fiduciary rule in cases arising under the implied
private cause of action of rule 10b-5 can not be supported by incon-
venience to the federal government. Although the private cause of
action under rule 10b-5 has been judicially implied from the pur-
poses of the 1934 Act, the courts have not found it necessary to
create a complete body of law to enforce this cause of action"
84. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
85. Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HAv. L. REV. 1512, 1517-19 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as The Federal Common Law].
86. Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decisions, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 1084, 1090 (1964).
87. Id. at 1090-93.
88. Federal Corporation Law, supra note 35, at 1153-67.
89. The Federal Common Law, supra note 85, at 1527-31.
90. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L.
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Whether the lower federal courts can or should create a federal
fiduciary law is debatable. But the court which does must reason
through the need for such a law.
The view of those courts which refuse to become entangled in
issues of substantive fairness is the better view. By attempting to
fit a federal fiduciary law within the parameters of rule 10b-5, those
courts which rule on fairness are attempting to turn the rule into a
procrustean bed.
FUTURE LAW
Judicial Expansion of Rule 10b-5
None of the courts which have concluded that a corporate freeze-
out constitutes a rule 10b-5 violation have analyzed the nature of
"fraud" under the rule. Such an analysis can be made by reviewing
analogous statutory and case law.
In construing language in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
which is similar to the language of rule 10b-511 in SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau," the Supreme Court considered whether
the terms "fraud and deceit" were used in their technical sense,
requiring intent to injure as an element of the offense. In concluding
that Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act to be construed
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes, the Court held that
fraud under the Act did not require proof of intent to injure. The
Court also considered the common law differences between fraud at
law and fraud in equity. While fraud at law is primarily a tort,
constrained by stringent requirements, fraud in equity is:
[A] conveniently comprehensive word for the expression of a lapse
from the high standard of conscientiousness that it exacted from
any party occupying a certain contractual or fiduciary relation
towards another party. 3
The 1934 Act is not a direct analogue of the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940. The latter is a comprehensive substantive law regulat-
ing investment advisers, whereas the former regulates corporate in-
siders only insofar as securities transactions are involved and does
REV. 383, 413-14 (1964).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970), provides in relevant part that:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails or any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly -
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective
client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client . ...
92. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
93. Id. at 193, quoting H. HANHURY, MODERN EQUITY 643 (8th ed. 1962).
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not pre-empt complementary state laws 4 Nevertheless, the rule of
Capital Gains Research Bureau, that federal securities laws should
be construed flexibly because they are remedial, is applicable to the
1934 Act and, in particular, to rule 10b-5.15
One of the classes of fraud cognizable in equity is fraud presumed
from the circumstances and condition of the parties. This class in-
cludes transactions presumptively invalid between persons in a fi-
duciary relationship." If federal courts hold that a fiduciary rela-
tionship exists between controlling shareholders and minority
shareholders as a matter of federal fiduciary law, then there is a
basis for holding that allegations of a freeze-out state a prima facie
claim under rule 10b-5, even if full disclosure has been made. 7
However, this view ignores the referrent and enabling language of
section 10(b), which speaks only of "manipulative or deceptive"
devices. The clear case is one of nondisclosure, in which the prohibi-
tion against deceptive devices provides a ground for finding a rule
10b-5 violation. When full disclosure has been made, however, there
is no deception and only manipulation can provide a basis for find-
ing a violation of the section and the rule. "Manipulative devices"
are not defined in section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. The terms of section
2(3) of the 1934 Act refer to manipulation and control of prices;98
sections 999 and 15(c) I°0 of the 1934 Act refer to manipulation of
security prices on exchange and over-the-counter markets, respec-
tively. While the "manipulative devices" proscribed by rule 10b-5
are not limited by sections 9 and 15(c), particularly insofar as those
sections require intent,'"' it seems reasonably clear that congres-
94. See Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, in SELECTED ESSAYS IN
SECURITIES REGULATION 877 and n.38 (1968).
95. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972).
96. 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 874 at 424, § 958d at 815-16 (5th ed. 1941).
97. Bromberg suggests that a violation of rule 10b-5 would be easy to plead in a freeze-
out merger and recommends as the central allegation:
The defendants engaged in a course of business which operated as a fraud on the
minority shareholders by using the defendants' control over the company to have
it merge with 2d company on terms that were grossly inadequate for the minority
shareholders of the company, thereby causing them damage.
1 BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW FRAUD: SEC RULE 1OB-5 § 4.7 (632) at 88.101 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as BROMBERG].
98. 15 U.S.C. § 78b(3) (1970) provides in part:
Frequently the prices of securities on such exchanges and markets are susceptible
to manipulation and control, and the dissemination of such prices gives rise to
excessive speculation, resulting in sudden and unreasonable fluctuations in the
prices of securities . ..
99. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1970).
101. 2 BROMBERG, supra note 97, at §§ 8.4 (410) at 204.41, and (457) at 204.91 (Supp. 70-
2, 1970); id. § 8.4 (505) at 204.106 (Supp. 71, 1971).
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sional attention focused only on manipulation of prices. The Senate
Report on the 1934 Act stated:
Subsection 10(b) authorizes the Commission by rules and regula-
tions to prohibit or regulate the use of any other manipulative or
deceptive practices which it finds detrimental to the interest of the
investor. 1"2
The counter-argument is that since the deception prohibited by
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 is not limited to deception involving the
value of the security,'"3 neither should manipulation be limited to
mean price manipulation.
Most cases decided to date, however, have not found a corporate
freeze-out violative of section 10(b) or rule 10b-5.14 These cases are
consistent with the view that the section and rule are primarily
disclosure provisions' 5 and that the manipulative devices pro-
scribed by section 10(b) refer to manipulations of price and not to
the use of majority power to "manipulate" the position of the minor-
ity stockholder. Even the cases decided under the "new fraud" doc-
trine center on allegations of inadequate consideration flowing to
the corporation. 0
The federal courts' reluctance to litigate "fairness" is consonant
with the view that the 1934 Act is primarily a disclosure statute,' 7
"ill-equipped to reach the problems of substantive fairness raised by
going private,"'0 8 and that "the SEC should not pass upon the mer-
its of specific securities transactions."''09 The issue of substantive
fairness is really an issue of breach of fiduciary duty."10 One com-
102. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934) (emphasis added). The author of
Recent Developments in Corporate Freeze-Outs, supra note 18, interprets this language as
support for his conclusion that a freeze-out is a 10b-5 violation. Id. at 1271.
103. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 9-10 (1971).
104. For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 61 through 80 supra. Contra,
Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Albright v. Bergendahl,
391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1975). For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 48
through 60 supra.
105. E.g., W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 332 (1968).
106. E.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 906 (1969) (wholly inadequate consideration); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir.
1968)(fraudulently low price); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970) (grossly inade-
quate price).
107. 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 21 (2d ed. 1961):
Then too, there is the recurrent theme throughout these statutes of disclosure, again
disclosure, and still more disclosure. Substantive regulation has its limits. But
"The truth shall make you free."
108. Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 912 (1975).
109. Address by Roger Mulvihill, The New York Securities Co. Seminar "Going Private,"
Feb. 8, 1975, in CORPORATE COUNSEL'S ANNUAL - 1975, at 1029 (1975).
110. 2 A. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 11.15[6] at 11-62.2
(1974).
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mentator has noted that "[i]t is one thing for federal courts to
enforce recognized, state-created fiduciary duties but quite another
for them to create new fiduciary duties.""'
The crucial question, therefore, is whether such a federal fidu-
ciary law will be created under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Despite
Commissioner Sommer's praise of the federal courts' "resourceful
applications of rule 10b-5,""2 judicial creation of such a law in the
near future is unlikely. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores,"3 the Supreme Court stated that the judicially implied pri-
vate cause of action under rule 10b-5 must be delimited "one way
or another unless and until Congress addresses the question.""' Pro-
fessor Loss sees this decision as "opening up for reargument all past
decisions on the reach of 10b-5."115 Without doubt, the lower federal
courts will heed the warning and retrench. Accordingly, the inter-
pretation of rule 10b-5 which excludes consideration of the
substantive terms of corporate freeze-outs may become the majority
rule.
SEC Release 5567 and Proposed Rules
Because the judiciary may refrain from using existing federal se-
curities laws to regulate going private, the SEC is considering
whether it should do so. In early 1975, the SEC issued alternative
proposed rules pursuant to section 13(e) of the 1934 Act"' covering
going private transactions and initiated a public fact-finding
investigation for the purpose of determining whether the Commis-
sion should adopt going private rules or recommend legislation to
protect minority shareholders." 7 Questions regarding the adequacy
of state remedies and the concern expressed by shareholders and the
investment community regarding the fairness and impact of going
private transactions led the SEC to propose rules which include
substantive provisions.
111. Going Private - Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, supra note 5, at 1037.
112. Sommer I, supra note 37, at D-2.
113. 95 S.Ct. 1919 (1975).
114. Id. at 1932 (emphasis added).
115. Moskowitz, The New Push for Federal Rule over Corporate Charters, Bus. WK., Sept.
1, 1975, at 57.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1970). Under section 13(e), it is unlawful for a registered issuer:
[T]o purchase any equity security issued by it if such purchase is in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission, in the public interest or for the
protection of investors, may adopt (A) to define acts and practices which are fraud-
ulent, deceptive, or manipulative, and (B) to prescribe means reasonably designed
to prevent such acts and practices.
117. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5567 (Feb. 6, 1975).
19761
Loyola University Law Journal
Under the proposed rules it would be unlawful for an issuer or its
affiliates to engage in certain transactions, including repurchases of
the issuer's shares, except in compliance with the detailed provi-
sions of the proposed rules. Proposed Rule 13e-3A would regulate
certain issuer repurchases, tender and exchange offers, and solicita-
tions of proxies, consents or authorizations in connection with: a
merger, consolidation or similar business combination; the sale of
substantially all issuer assets to an affiliate; or a reverse stock split
involving the purchase of fractional shares." 8 These transactions
would be regulated by the proposed rule only if they could result in
delisting by a national securities exchange, deregistration pursuant
to section 12(g)(4) of the 1934 Act, suspension of reporting obliga-
tions pursuant to section 15(d) of the 1934 Act, or termination of
NASDAQ authorization."' Proposed Rule 13e-3B would regulate
those purchases of the issuer's stock by the issuer or its affiliates:
which are intended to compel a shareholder to terminate his status
as a shareholder or to reduce the amount of the issuer's outstanding
stock not held by affiliates by 25 percent or more; or which could
result in delisting by a national securities exchange, deregistration
under section 12(g) of the 1934 Act, suspension of reporting under
section 15(d) of the 1934 Act or termination of NASDAQ authoriza-
tion. 20
The substantive provisions of Proposed Rule 13e-3A include a
requirement that the consideration for shares constitute "fair
value," as determined by the offeror in good faith, but not less than
the value recommended jointly by two qualified independent ap-
praisers.' 2' In addition, if the transaction involves a cash tender offer
or exchange offer, tendering shareholders must be able to withdraw
deposited shares any time prior to acceptance; shares deposited
within the first 20 days must be accepted pro-rata; any increase in
consideration must apply to all shares accepted; and all shares pur-
chased within the 60-day period following the tender offer will be
deemed purchased pursuant to the tender offer. If the transaction
results in freeing the issuer from the reporting requirements of sec-
tions 12 or 15(d) of the 1934 Act, the offeror must so notify non-
tendering shareholders and allow them an additional 20 days to
tender their shares as part of the same offer.'22 Alternatively, the
118. Subsection (a)(5)(i) of Proposed Rule 13e-3A, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 23,704, at
17,245-3. Proposed Rule 13e-3A is hereinafter referred to as Proposed Rule 13e-3A.
119. Subsection (a)(5)(ii) of Proposed Rule 13e-3A, supra note 118, at 17,245-4.
120. Subsection (b) of Proposed Rule 13e-3B, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 23,705, at 17.245-
9. Proposed Rule 13e-3B is hereinafter referred to as Proposed Rule 13e-3B.
121. Subsection (c)(2) of Proposed Rule 13e-3A, supra note 118, at 17,245-6.
122. Subsection (c)(3) of Proposed Rule 13e-3A, supra note 118, at 17,245-7.
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terms of Proposed Rule 13e-3B would require that all terms of a
transaction, including consideration, be fair, and that if the transac-
tion is initiated by the issuer, it have a "valid business purpose"
therefor. ,2 3
Section 13(e) of the 1934 Act confers rule-making power upon the
SEC to regulate issuer repurchases, but that power is limited to
defining and preventing fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts
and practices,'24 and to imposing disclosure requirements.'21 Rule
13e-1, the only rule adopted pursuant to section 13(e), prohibits
undisclosed issuer purchases during a take-over attempt.'26 A second
rule, proposed in 1973 and not yet enacted, would regulate issuer
repurchases in detail by defining as a fraudulent, deceptive or ma-
nipulative act any repurchase not in accordance with the limitations
imposed by the proposed rule.' 7 This proposed rule has been criti-
cized as being beyond the scope of the rule-making power granted
in section 13(e). 128
The rules proposed under section 13(e) to limit going private
transactions' are vulnerable to the same criticism. Two commenta-
tors, writing prior to announcement of the proposed rules, have
taken opposite positions regarding the scope of the Commission's
rule-making power under section 13(e). Professor Kerr asserted that
the SEC could substantively regulate going private through section
13(e) rules. He suggested that the SEC could use its rule-making
power under section 13(e) in the same expansive manner in which
it has used its rule-making power under section 10(b).' 30 Professor
Borden, however, questioned whether the Commission could or
should create a substantive rule of fairness under section 13(e) and
anticipated a vigorous debate on the issue. 3' As he expected, the
123. Subsection (a) of Proposed Rule 13e-3B, supra note 120.
124, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)(1) (1970).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)(2) (1970).
126. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-1 (1975).
127. Proposed Reg. § 240.13e-2, adopted in Release No. 34-8370, 33 Fed. Reg. 11017 (July
30, 1968); and amended by Release No. 34-8392, 33 Fed. Reg. 14110 (Aug. 30, 1968) and
Release No. 34-8556, 34 Fed. Reg. 6101 (Mar. 24, 1969); 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 23,702
(1974).
128. Brown, The Scope of the Williams Act and Its 1970 Amendments, 26 Bus. LAW. 1637,
1643 (1971).
129. Proposed Rules 13e-3A and 13e-3B, supra notes 118 and 120.
130. Going Private: Adopting a Corporate Purpose Standard, supra note 7, at 36-37 (foot-
notes omitted).
131. Going Private - Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, supra note 5, at 1036 n.220.
Professor Borden also considers the consequences of the federal adoption of a per se prohibi-
tion of corporate freeze-outs by positing hypotheticals which illustrate the myriad variables
involved in freeze-outs, such as percentage of control, relative approval or disapproval by
outside or minority shareholders, full disclosure and fair price, and permutations of these
variables. Id. at 1038-39.
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authority of the Commission to include substantive requirements in
the proposed rules has been questioned, although not unanimously,
by securities law experts.'32
An obvious analogy exists between the proposed going private
rules and certain provisions of the Williams Act.'33 This analogy
supports a conclusion that the substantive provisions of the pro-
posed rules are beyond the scope of the Commission's rule-making
power under section 13(e). Congress, not the Commission, imposed
substantive limitations on tender offers through the Williams Act.
Similarly, any substantive provisions regulating going private trans-
actions should originate in Congress.
CONCLUSION
The equities involved in going private and freeze-out transactions
are being considered by state courts. These courts have found par-
ticular transactions unfair to minority shareholders by measuring
the transaction at issue against a variety of increasingly stringent
standards of fairness. Although some authorities find state court
efforts inadequate, state law remedies are available to minority
shareholders who seek them. Therefore, existing federal securities
laws, and rule 10b-5 in particular, should not be applied by federal
courts to test the fairness of going private or freeze-out transactions,
nor should new rules be promulgated by the SEC to substantively
regulate these transactions, in the absence of a clear congressional
mandate or a compelling need for a uniform substantive federal law.
ANNE JENTRY
132. The comments received by the Commission regarding the proposed rules have been
divided. Generally, investors favor the proposed rules while members of the securities bar and
the investment community do not. Investor Comments Favor SEC "Going Private" Propos-
als; Bar Opposes Them, BNA SEC. REM. L. REP. 318A-I (Sept. 10, 1975).
133. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (July 29, 1968); amended by Pub. L. No. 91-567
(Dec. 22, 1970). Section 13(d) of the 1934 Act requires certain disclosures after acquisition of
more than five percent of the outstanding shares of a registered security, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)
(1970). Proposed Rule 13e-3B, supra note 120, would require certain disclosures if the acquisi-
tion of more than 25 percent of the publicly-held shares of a registered security is planned.
Section 14(d)(1) of the 1934 Act requires that a tender offeror file a statement with the SEC,
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1970). Proposed Rules 13e-3A and 13e-3B, supra notes 118 and 120, would
require that an issuer or its affiliates file a statement with the SEC. Section 14(d)(5), (6) and
(7) contain tender offer withdrawal, pro rata acceptance and increased consideration provi-
sions similar to those contained in Proposed Rules 13e-3A and 13e-3B, supra notes 118 and
120.
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